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Abstract—Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are nowadays
forced to continuously invest in their network infrastructure
to keep up with the increasing bandwidth demand and traffic
load coming from mobile users. In this context, MNOs have to
face the strategic problem of whether to invest on their own
or deploy shared networks. We address here the problem of
Radio Access Network (RAN) and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile
networks. Namely, we consider the case in which multiple MNOs
are planning to deploy small cell Base Stations to improve their
current network infrastructure; the deployment investment may
be shared with other MNOs, thus giving rise to shared RANs.
The RAN and spectrum sharing problem is formalized as a
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the strategy of
each MNO in the game is twofold: selecting a coalition (whom to
cooperate) and the fraction of the coalition cost to pay, with
the goal of maximizing the individual return on investment.
The proposed approach is leveraged to characterize the stable
coalitions and their respective cost division policies for various
network and economic conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential growth of mobile data and the increas-
ing diffusion of “bandwidth-eager” user applications [1] is
pushing the migration to more spectrally efficient mobile
technologies such as LTE-A and eventually 5G. However,
individual network roll-outs represent large sunk costs for
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) and particularly for new-
entrants1 [3] especially given the currently unaligned growth
of data demand from MNO revenues. Sharing agreements for
greenfield network deployments are an attractive alternative
to cut down on the upfront infrastructure cost but also, when
spectrum sharing is allowed, to benefit from aggregating spec-
trum resources, where the latter is essential to boost network
capacity.
There are several alternatives for network sharing depending
on the “depth” of the network architecture affected by sharing
and/or its “scale”, that is, geographical footprint [4,5]. While
passive sharing (site and mast sharing) is nowadays either
mandated by regulators or voluntary adopted due to restrictions
on the number of available sites [5,6], there are also several
1Despite some countries regulator efforts to encourage competition in
mobile networks, by introducing spectrum set-asides during auctions and
relaxing their coverage requirements, new entrants do not always succeed
in deploying a network which may lead to inefficient spectrum allocations or
eventually with the set-aside spectrum ending up in the hands of incumbent
MNOs [2].
examples of 50:50 joint ventures for 3G/4G greenfield network
deployments in which MNOs share the Radio Access Network
(RAN) and, in some cases, also the spectrum [7].
In this work, we investigate a network sharing scenario
which is referred to as common spectrum network sharing
in the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specifica-
tions for network sharing [8]. Namely, we consider the case
in which several MNOs operate through a single (shared)
RAN but keep separate core networks; “MNOs share the
total spectrum obtained from pooling together their respective
allocated spectrum portions while it is also possible for MNOs
with no allocated spectrum to use the pooled spectrum” [8].
Implementation-wise, a candidate enabler of such scenarios
for 4G networks is Carrier Aggregation (CA), a standardized
feature of LTE-A [9] that allows to boost the network capacity
by pooling together the spectrum allocated in different bands2.
We consider a set of MNOs with consolidated market shares
and fixed allocated spectrum, which have plans to upgrade
their RAN by investing in the deployment of small cell Base
Stations (BSs) so as to improve the service and increase the
revenues. Each MNO has to face the strategic problem of
whether to upgrade its RAN by itself or to sign a sharing
agreement with other MNOs. In case sharing agreements are
put in place, we assume that each coalition of MNOs sharing
the RAN will use all the aggregated spectrum resources of
its members. We resort to a non-cooperative game theory
approach and model the RAN/spectrum sharing problem as a
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem3 (GNEP) [11], where
the strategy of each MNO consists of selecting a coalition and
a fraction of the coalition cost to pay so that its individual
return on investment is maximized. We characterize the stable
coalitions and their respective cost division policies for differ-
ent networks (user throughput, market and spectrum shares)
and economic settings (coalition cost, mobile data pricing
model).
The manuscript is organized as follows: A short literature
review is presented in Section II; the problem and the GNEP
formulation are stated in Section III; Sections IV and V
2According to [10], 116 operators have commercially launched LTE-A with
CA. Moreover, given the throughput targets of 5G, CA will most likely be an
enabler for future generation networks.
3In GNEPs the strategy of each player affects not only the other players’
payoff, as in Nash Equilibrium Problems, but also their strategy domains.
describe the considered scenarios and analyze the equilibria.
Concluding remarks are drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been largely used for addressing several
problems arising in HetNets [12] and in particular to model re-
source and network sharing problems. Non-cooperative games
have been adopted in [13] and [14]: [13] models spectrum
sharing in unlicensed bands among selfish MNOs, whereas
[14] models problems of network selection in a heteroge-
neous wireless access network scenario. Instead, [15] and [16]
resort to cooperative game theory. Hew et al. ([15]) model
the problem of resource allocation in a shared network in
two steps: the resource sharing among the operators, and
the resource bargaining among the users and Mobile Virtual
Network Operators of each operator. The sharing of different
wireless access technologies among operators is considered
in [16]. Along the same lines, [17] investigates the sharing
between LTE access network femtocells and a Wi–Fi access
network.
In the context of infrastructure and spectrum sharing,
coalition formation is addressed in [18]–[20] through non-
cooperative games. These works bear similarities with ours as
they also aim at determining stable coalitions for a finite set of
MNOs with fixed market shares and pre-allocated spectrum.
However, players (MNOs) payoffs are expressed only in terms
of network cost estimates and in a coalition such costs are
split either uniformly among its members [18,19] or according
to the Shapley value [20]. Differently, we propose here more
refined payoff models for the MNOs: in fact, we account for
both the MNO revenue (as a function of the average user rate
perceived by users) and cost in determining the MNO’s payoff
for a given strategy profile where, in particular, the share of
cost paid by an MNO in a coalition is part of its strategy
and not set a priori. In our work, the coalition formation is
explicitly modeled as a GNEP, which has been lately used
to model problems concerning players that share a common
resource (e.g., in telecommunications, the power allocation
problem for a Digital Subscriber Line [11]).
III. THE PROBLEM
A. Problem statement
We consider a set O of MNOs that coexist in a dense
urban area where they provide data services through pre-4G
macrocell networks but aim at upgrading their radio access
technology by deploying 4G small cells. We assume MNOs
inherit the share of users from their individual up and running
networks, that is, being N the number of users in the given
area, each MNO i ∈ O has a fixed market share σi. We
further assume that at least one of the MNOs owns a spectrum
license4 of bi units (possibly zero) of bandwidth which it plans
4A spectrum license is usually purchased at the time spectrum auctions are
organized and therefore it is not immediately associated to any network infras-
tructure although the license acquisition requires for services to be launched
within given deadlines. Moreover, 2G/3G networks spectrum licenses are
being refarmed for higher spectral efficiency technologies such as 4G [21].
to exploit for the network of small cells. Each MNO may
decide to deploy its individual network of small cells or to
collaborate with other MNOs to deploy a shared one. If at
least two MNOs deploy a shared network, we assume they
will agree on aggregating their available spectrum. We denote
by S the set of all possible coalitions that can be created, that
is, the set of all the possible subsets of MNOs agreeing to
deploy a shared network and by Si the set of the coalitions
MNO i can join. If all the MNOs in s ∈ S decide to join
coalition s, then s deploys a shared network infrastructure
of total cost c˜s which has to be split among its members,
that is, each MNO i ∈ s has to pay a fraction of c˜s while
incurring revenues r˜is (see Section III-C). The strategy of MNO
i consists of selecting a coalition from Si and the fraction of
its cost to pay that maximizes its return on investment, that is,
the difference between its revenues r˜is and the fraction of c˜s
it is accounted for. Since a coalition cannot be created unless
selected by all its members and the total cost of a coalition
has to be split among them, it is clear that the strategy of
each MNO depends on the strategies of the other MNOs: we
formulate this problem as a GNEP where the set of players
coincides with the set of MNOs.
B. Generalized Nash game model
Since the strategy of each MNO i ∈ O consists of selecting
a coalition and deciding the fraction of the coalition cost it will
pay, we define two families of variables {xis ∈ {0, 1}}s∈Si
and {αis ∈ [0, 1]}s∈Si . Variable xis equals 1 if MNO i would
like to join coalition s ∈ Si and 0 otherwise; variable αis
represents the fraction of the cost c˜s MNO i is willing to pay.
However, coalition s cannot be created unless selected by all
its members. Therefore we define variables {yis ∈ {0, 1}}s∈Si ,
where yis equals 1 if MNO i really joins the coalition s since
all the members of s are willing to join s (i.e., xjs = 1 for any
j ∈ s). Roughly speaking, xis represent what the player would
like to do, while yis represent what it really does. The utility of
MNO i from coalition s is then equal to r˜isy
i
s−c˜sαis. Therefore,
the problem of MNO i can be formulated as follows, where






s − c˜sαis) (1)∑
s∈Si
xis ≤ 1 (2)






αjs, ∀s ∈ Si (4)
xis ∈ {0, 1},yis ∈ {0, 1},αis ∈ [0, 1], ∀s ∈ Si (5)
The objective function (1) maximizes the sum over all
coalitions of the utility of MNO i, namely its return on
investment. Constraint (2) makes sure that MNO i becomes
part of at most one coalition, whereas constraints (3) guarantee
that MNO i selects only an active coalition, i.e., a coalition
selected by all of its members. Constraints (4) set to zero all
the fractions of cost αis for the coalitions MNO i is not part of
and guarantee that the total cost of an active coalition is split
among its members, that is, given the fraction of cost MNOs
j ∈ s\{i} are willing to pay, MNO i should pay the remaining
cost fraction. Finally, (5) gives the variable domains.
Notice that, for each coalition s ∈ S, constraints (3) and
(4) make the strategy space of each MNO i ∈ s dependent on
the strategies selected by MNOs j ∈ s \ {i}.
We look for equilibria for this problem, which are all the
coalitional structures such that each MNO belonging to a
coalition with at least two members cannot improve its profit
by leaving the coalition.
C. Cost and revenues definition
Since the RAN cost is the dominant component of the
total cellular network cost [22], we limit the cost analysis
only to radio equipments and adopt a simplified leased line
pricing model for the backhaul transmission cost as in [23].
Let D be the investment period and gs the total cost incurred
in D from a single small cell BS activated by coalition s,
which accounts for the radio equipment capital (CAPEX) and
operational (OPEX) expenditures, backhauling cost and the
site buildout cost. Let b˜s be the aggregated bandwidth of
coalition s, that is, b˜s =
∑
i∈s bi, whereas βs denotes the
number of MNOs in s that have a spectrum license, that is,
βs = |{i ∈ s : bi > 0}|. The radio equipment CAPEX gc,rs
consists of the cost gc,rsmall of a single-carrier small cell BS and
of a fixed radio equipment cost per additional carrier supported
by a single BS calculated as a percentage φ of the cost gc,rmacro
of a single-carrier macrocell BS (as in [24]):
gc,rs = g
c,r
small + (βs − 1)φgc,rmacro. (6)
The backhaul leased line pricing model consists of an upfront
fee gc,b and the annual leasing cost go,bs that we assume, in the
worst case, will be proportional to b˜s. Thus, being go,b0 the
annual leased line cost for a b0 (units of bandwidth) carrier,
we set go,bs equal to
b˜s
b0
go,b0 . The Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) annual cost of the radio equipment is calculated as
a percentage ξ of the corresponding total radio CAPEX [23,
25]. Therefore, the total cost gs incurred by coalition s from













We remark that the considered cost values refer to HSPA
technology as in [23,24], given that, to the best of our
knowledge, CA-enabled equipment cost are not made publicly
available by any vendor. However, in [24] it is argued that costs
of the physical infrastructure of new radio access technologies
tend to be similar to previous ones, therefore such costs
represent a good estimate at least in orders of magnitude.
The revenues r˜is incurred by MNO i in coalition s are
calculated based on a simple data service pricing model
defined as a function of the average data rate perceived by
users of s as in [26]. Let ρnoms (us) be the nominal user rate
coalition s can obtain activating us BSs. In LTE, the nominal
user rate is the maximum achievable rate for a certain level
of Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) and a given
system bandwidth perceived by a single user when assigned
all downlink LTE resource blocks from its serving BS. The
downlink SINR is a function of the number of BSs activated
by the coalition the user belongs to, as a larger number of BSs
results in the user being on the average closer to its serving
BS, and therefore receiving a stronger signal, but also closer to
the interfering ones5. The average rate ρs(us) perceived by a
user in coalition s can be expressed as a function of ρnoms (us)





i∈s σiN)/us , ∀s ∈ S, (8)
where parameter η is the user activity factor representing
the probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving
BS,
∑
i∈s σiN is the total number of users of coalition s
whereas (
∑
i∈s σiN)/us gives the average number of users
served by one BS. The nominal rate is therefore scaled down
by the factor (1 − η)(
∑
i∈s σiN)/us representing the average
congestion level at a serving BS.
Let δ denote the monthly price per user and per unit (Mbps)
of data service. Given an average user rate ρs(us) provided
by coalition s ∈ Si by activating us BSs (see Section IV), the
revenues ris incurred from MNO i when in s, at the end of
the investment lifetime D are modeled as a linear function of
ρs(us):
ris = δDσiNρs(us), ∀i ∈ s. (9)
Let u˜s denote the number of BSs that maximizes the global










where Umax represents the maximum number of small cell
sites coalition s can activate in the area. Finally, the revenues
r˜is of MNO i from coalition s and the total cost c˜s of coalition
s are given as follows:
r˜is = δDσiNρs(u˜s), ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ s, (11)
c˜s = gsu˜s, ∀s ∈ S. (12)
IV. COMPUTATIONAL SETTING
A. Parameter setting
Parameters are set as shown in Table I.
We consider 3 MNOs A, B and C and a 4 km2 area
populated by 20000 users. We set Umax to 10000, which is an
arbitrarily large number of BSs for the considered area size.
Nevertheless, the number of activated BSs by any coalition
does not exceed 1500 for all the considered instances. We
report the key results for two values of δ: a low (δ = 0.75)
and a high value (δ = 2). We set up 5 scenarios representing
different mixtures of market shares and “spectrum shares”6 as
shown in Table II, where values of bi, that is, of the bandwidth
5Any other BS transmission will use at least a subset of the available
resource blocks and therefore unavoidably interfere.
6The term “spectrum share” is used analogously with market share to
represent, bi/
∑
j∈O bj , that is, the weight of the spectrum of an MNO w.r.t.
to the total obtained aggregating the spectrum of all MNOs.
Symbol Description Value
O Set of MNOs {A,B,C}
S Set of coalitions 2O \ ∅
Si Set of coalitions MNO i ∈ O can join
N Total number of users in the area 20000
A Area size 4 km2
Umax Max. number of BSs in the area 10000
δ Monthly price of 1 Mbps {0.75,2}e/Mbps
D Investment lifetime 120 months [27]
η User activity factor 0.01
gc,rsmall Single-carrier small cell BS radio equipment cost 3000e [23]
gc,rmacro Single-carrier macro cell BS radio equipment cost 20000e [23]
φ Cost coefficient per additional carrier 0.017 [24]
gc,b Upfront fee for backhaul 2000e [23]
go,b0 Annual leased line cost for carrier b0=5MHz 2000e [23]
gc,s Site buildout cost 2000e [23]
ξ O&M annual percentage 15% [25]
TABLE I: Sets, parameters and corresponding values
associated with the spectrum license of each MNO, are set to
standardized bandwidths for LTE/LTE-A ({1.4, 3, 5, 10, 15,
20} MHz). Scenarios S4 and S5 represent particular cases that
may arise given how spectrum auctions are currently designed.
We consider an extreme case in which there is only one MNO
in the area that has managed to obtain a spectrum license from
a recent auction: either the smallest MNO (S4), for instance, a
new entrant which has benefited from the set-aside spectrum
policy [3], or the incumbent (S5), which is the most likely to
be the highest bidder.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
σi 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6
bi 5 5 5 1.4 5 10 5 5 5 15 0 0 0 0 15
TABLE II: Scenarios
B. Simulation environment
A simulation environment was set up to derive the average
user rate ρs(us) for each coalition s as function of the number
us of activated small cell BSs varying from 1 to Umax as in
[26]. The us BSs and 10 sample users are uniformly distributed
in a pseudo-random fashion on the considered square area.
The downlink SINR of each sample user for a reference
system bandwidth is obtained scaling down the interference
perceived by the sample user with the load of coalition s,
ls = 1 − (1 − η)(
∑
i∈s σiN)/us , since users are characterized
by an activity factor η. The calculated SINR is mapped to
LTE spectral efficiency according to a multilevel SINR–to–
spectral efficiency scheme [28]. The spectral efficiency is
then multiplied by the coalition aggregated bandwidth b˜s, to
obtain the nominal user rate ρnoms (us). The simulation is run
100 times for each value of us so that an average value for
ρnoms (us) is obtained across all sample users and runs. Finally,
ρs(us) is derived from ρnoms (us) according to Equations (8).
C. Equilibria calculation
We calculate the equilibria of the GNEP approximating it
with a discrete strategy space. For each MNO i and for each
coalition s ∈ Si we discretize the cost fraction αis with a step
of 0.01 and thus the strategy set for each player i consists of
the Cartesian product between the finite set of possible cost
fractions {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . 1} and the set Si. Strategy profiles
that lead to infeasible outcomes (e.g., the cost fractions of a
coalition do not sum to 1 or coalitions selected by MNOs
do not coincide) are discarded. Among the equilibria of the
discretized GNEP Pareto dominated ones are identified: if E1
and E2 are two equilibria and pi1 and p
i
2 the corresponding
payoff of each player i, then E1 is Pareto dominated by E2
if pi2 ≥ pi1 for any i and E2 is strictly preferred over E1 by
at least one player.
V. ANALYSIS OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
For 3 MNOs, there are 5 possible coalitional structures:
all MNOs build separate networks (A,B,C), 2 MNOs build
a shared network whereas the third one builds its own
(AB,C)/(AC,B)/(BC,A) and all MNOs collaborate and build
a single/shared network (ABC). Tables III–XII illustrate the
obtained equilibria for each considered scenario (Table II) for
the two values of δ: for each coalitional structure representing
an equilibrium (row), we report the range of stable percentage
of costs for each member (column).
For instance, in scenario S1 (Table III) (AB,C) is an
equilibrium if A pays at least 39% of the cost of coalition
(AB) since B is willing to pay at most 61% of the cost and
vice versa since MNOs have equal market shares. C instead
builds its own network and pays all of its costs (represented
by a cost fraction 100%). The color code is the following:
dark grey cells represent cases where no network of small
cells is built because it is either not profitable, that is, MNOs
obtain a non-negative return on investment (e.g., MNO A
has only 1.4 MHz of bandwidth and δ is low (Table V))
or it is not feasible since no MNO in the coalition has a
spectrum license (e.g., in scenario S4 (Tables IX, X), B and C
have no spectrum license and therefore cannot invest neither
together nor by themselves regardless of δ). Equilibria that are
not Pareto dominated are represented by white cells whereas
Pareto dominated ones are highlighted in grey. However, for
the same coalitional structure there can be both dominated and
non-dominated equilibria depending on how the coalition cost
is split among its members (see, e.g., Table IX: for δ = 0.75,
if the cost of (AC) is split between A and C as 0%:100%,
(AC,B) is not Pareto dominated, but it is if split, for instance,
as 15%:85%).
A. Equilibria and scenarios
For certain ranges of cost fractions, all the coalitional
structures are equilibria for all the considered scenarios. —
(A,B,C) is always an equilibrium of the game since, given that
2 MNOs decide to invest by themselves, the third one has no
choice but to do the same. Instead, since each MNO has always
the choice of investing by itself given any strategy of the other
MNOs, the fact that any coalition of 2 (AB, AC, BC) or the
grand coalition (ABC) are equilibria for certain ranges of cost
fractions means that any MNO is better off collaborating with
at least another MNO, due either to the combined gain of
spectrum pooling and cost sharing (scenarios S1–S3) or purely
to benefit of sharing the network cost (scenarios S4 and S5,
for which only one MNO has a spectrum license).
B. Cost repartition and δ
Cost repartition is influenced by the value of δ — For
instance, in scenarios S4 and S5, when MNOs gain little for
each unit of service (low δ), the maximum the MNO with
a spectrum license would pay to be in a coalition does not
exceed its share of users in the coalition (Tables IX, XI):
in scenario S4 (Table IX), MNO A, which is the only one
with a spectrum license, is willing to pay at most 10% of
the (ABC) cost, 27% of the (AB) cost and 15% of the (AC)
cost which approximately represent its respective user share
in these coalitions. Instead, as B and C own no spectrum
license, they are willing to pay from 8 to 24% more than
their respective user shares in any coalition in which A is a
member. When MNOs gain more from their investment (high
δ), the MNO which brings the spectrum to the coalition can
leverage it to the point of not paying any network cost at all.
For instance, in scenario S5, δ = 2 (Table XII), in equilibrium
(ABC) with cost split as, e.g., 25%:75%:0% among A, B and
C, respectively, C pays no cost for the deployed network while
A and B share the cost proportionally to their market shares.
Similarly for scenario S4 (Table X).
C. Cost repartition, market share and spectrum share
Given a coalitional structure, the equilibrium coalition cost
division among its members reflects their user and spectrum
shares — For our baseline scenario S1 (Tables III, IV) the
symmetry in both the market and spectrum shares is reflected
in equal ranges of cost fractions for all members of a coalition.
In scenario S2 (Tables V, VI), in which MNOs have equal
market shares but different spectrum shares, the larger the
amount of spectrum an MNO brings to a coalition the smaller
the minimum cost fraction it has to pay to be part of it, which
is amplified by the increase of δ. For instance, for δ = 0.75,
MNO C contributes with 2/3 of the aggregated spectrum of
coalition (BC), and has to pay at least 33% of its costs whereas
B at least 42%, whereas for δ = 2, their cost fractions are
reduced to 3% and 26%, respectively. Scenario S3 (Tables VII,
VIII) illustrates the impact of the market share in the coalition
cost division when MNOs have equal spectrum shares. We can
see how the maximum cost fraction they are willing to pay
to be in any coalition reflects approximately their user shares
(see e.g., equilibrium (ABC) in Tables VII and VIII, where
although the maximum cost fraction increases with δ for each
MNO, the relative difference tends to follow the user shares;
e.g., B is willing to pay approximately 3 times more w.r.t. A
to be in (ABC) for both values of δ).
In scenarios S1–S3, as the price per unit of service increases,
so does the fraction of cost MNOs are willing to pay to be in
any coalition. For instance, in scenario S3, B would pay up
to 40% of the costs of coalition (BC) for δ = 0.75 but up to
56% for δ = 2, while C goes from 80% to 100%, which means
on the other hand that the minimum cost fraction they should
pay becomes smaller as δ increases. Similarly for all other
coalitions (Tables VII, VIII). In scenarios S4 and S5 instead,
it is only the MNOs with no spectrum license that significantly
increase the maximum cost fraction they are willing to pay to
be in any coalition in which the MNO with a spectrum license
is part of. For instance, in scenario S4, MNO A (the only one
owning a spectrum license) pays up to 10% of the cost of
(ABC) for δ = 0.75 but at most 9% for δ = 2, while the other
2 MNOs would pay more with the increase of δ (Tables IX,
X). In scenario S5 instead, in which the only MNO with a
spectrum license, C, is also the incumbent, it would pay only
3% more to be in (BC), 2% more to be in (AC) and only 1%
more to be in (ABC) as δ grows from 0.75 to 2 (Tables XI,
XII).
D. Dominated and non-dominated equilibria
All grand coalition (ABC) equilibria are not Pareto domi-
nated by any other equilibrium for all considered instances
— In scenarios S1–S3 and S5, for each equilibrium of a
coalitional structure different from the grand coalition (ABC)
there is an (ABC) equilibrium that Pareto dominates it, which
shows the gain of spectrum pooling. Instead, in scenario S4
(Tables IX, X), there are also other non-dominated coalitional
structure equilibria, e.g., for δ = 0.75, (AC,B) with the cost
of AC split as 0%:100%. While B clearly prefers (ABC) over
(AC,B) since it cannot build a network by itself without a
spectrum license, interestingly A prefers (AC) to (ABC), even
if it were to pay no fraction of the (ABC) cost, as (AC) is
a less congested coalition and all of its cost is paid by the
incumbent MNO (C). Instead, C prefers coalition (ABC) to
(AC) when it pays up to 70% of the (ABC) cost, otherwise it
prefers to pay for all the cost of (AC).
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 39-61% 39-61% 100%
(AC),(B) 39-61% 100% 39-61%
(BC),(A) 100% 39-61% 39-61%
(ABC) 18-41% 18-41% 18-41%
TABLE III: S1, δ = 0.75
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 10-90% 10-90% 100%
(AC),(B) 10-90% 100% 10-90%
(BC),(A) 100% 10-90% 10-90%
(ABC) 0-69% 0-69% 0-69%
TABLE IV: S1, δ = 2
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 46-55% 45-54% 100%
(AC),(B) 48-64% 100% 36-52%
(BC),(A) 42-67% 33-58%
(ABC) 20-42% 20-42% 16-38%
TABLE V: S2, δ = 0.75
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 36-100% 0-64% 100%
(AC),(B) 42-100% 100% 0-58%
(BC),(A) 100% 26-97% 3-74%
(ABC) 0-82% 0-71% 0-55%
TABLE VI: S2, δ = 2
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 11-30% 70-89% 100%
(AC),(B) 0-18% 82-100% 100%
(BC),(A) 100% 20-40% 60-80%
(ABC) 0-12% 14-37% 51-74%
TABLE VII: S3, δ = 0.75
A B C
(A),(B),(C) 100% 100% 100%
(AB),(C) 0-41% 59-100% 100%
(AC),(B) 0-24% 100% 76-100%
(BC),(A) 100% 0-56% 44-100%
(ABC) 0-20% 0-62% 18-100%







(ABC) 0-10% 13-38% 52-77%








(ABC) 0-9% 0-76% 15-100%






(ABC) 4-12% 30-38% 50-58%






(ABC) 0-25% 16-76% 0-59%
TABLE XII: S5, δ = 2
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we model the strategic problem of coalition
formation and coalition cost division in a RAN and spectrum
sharing scenario as a GNEP. We consider multiple MNOs with
fixed market shares and allocated spectrum that are planning to
upgrade their radio access of a dense urban area by deploying
small cell BSs. Each coalition of MNOs is assumed to exploit
all the aggregated spectrum resources of its members and
deploy a number of BSs that maximizes its global profit.
The strategy of each MNO consists of selecting a coalition
and a fraction of the coalition cost to pay which maximizes
its individual return on investment. A numerical analysis of
several scenarios representing different network and economic
configurations shows how for certain ranges of cost fractions
coalitions of at least two MNOs are always equilibria and
that the grand coalition equilibria are never Pareto dominated.
This shows how spectrum pooling and cost sharing incentivize
shared network configurations, while the stable cost divisions
reflect the MNOs’ relative user and spectrum shares.
The proposed GNEP can be a starting point for more
complex scenarios where MNOs are able to differentiate
service offered to their users and/or adopt different pricing
models.
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